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The major theme of the economic reforms initiated in
1978 has been to decentralise economic manage-
ment, giving greater autonomy to local governments
and state enterprises, and allowing the development
of non-state sectors. Within this context, fiscal
reforms during the 1980s have been characterised by
decentralisation. Despite the remarkable economic
performance over the past 18 years, comparable
improvements have not been achieved in the provi-
sion of basic social services to rural households. In
some poor areas these services have even deterio-
rated. Inadequate funding is a dominant problem in
the provision of basic social services in poor areas.
1 Overview of Fiscal
Decentralisation
Before 1980, China's fiscal system was highly cen-
tralised. All taxes and state enterprise profits were
remitted to the central government and transferred
back to the provinces according to planned expen-
diture needs approved by central government. In
the early 1980s, revenue sharing arrangements
between the central and local governments were
devised, with the aim of promoting local govern-
ments' tax mobilisation efforts.
There are five levels of government in China: national,
province, prefecture, county and township. In this
article, 'local' refers to governments at the provincial
level and below, unless otherwise stated. This section
emphasises revenue sharing between central and
provincial governments. The system of revenue shar-
ing has been extended to the arrangements between
provinces and their prefectures, between prefectures
and their counties, and so on. While there are some
local variations in the methods employed, the princi-
ples are largely the same at all levels.
1.1 Contract-based revenue
sharing
In 1980, a system of revenue sharing between cen-
tral and provincial governments was introduced.2
This article has benefited from many detailed and
valuable comments made by Adrian Wood, Gerald
Bloom and Christine Wong.
2 Some large cities were later accorded a special fiscal status
which allows them to share revenue directly with the centre
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The sharing scheme was modified twice, prior to
the more far-reaching tax reform of 1994. The basic
principles of these sharing schemes remained
unchanged until 1994.
The revenue sharing scheme of 1988-1993 provides
an illustration of how the system operated. The cen-
tral government determined the bases and rates of
all taxes. Almost all tax revenues were assessed and
collected by local governments' tax bureaux. All
revenues collected by provinces were classified into
three categories: fixed central government revenues,
fixed local government revenues, and shared rev-
enues. Provinces which in 1987 were in surplus
(i.e. whose fixed local plus shared revenues
exceeded their approved expenditures) were
required to turn over an agreed amount or percent-
age of their revenues to central government. The
remaining portion of shared revenues was retained
by the province. The precise sharing arrangements
were determined in case-by-case negotiations
between central and provincial governments.
A number of different sharing arrangements applied
to different provinces (Bahi and Wallich 1992). For
the majority of provinces in a surplus position, high
nominal growth rates of revenue in the contract
period implied that they were able to retain an
increased share of revenues. Those provinces in a
deficit position, mainly poorer provinces, received
subsidies from central government. However, these
subsidies were fixed in nominal terms, implying
declining subsidies in real terms.
2 Trends in Revenues and
Expenditures
2.1 Budgetary revenues
An important outcome of these revenue sharing
schemes was a decline in the 'two shares'. Between
1979 and 1993, the share of government revenue in
GNP declined by almost one half, from around 30
per cent to just over 15 per cent of GNP (Ma 1996).
The central revenue share in total government rev-
enue also declined during the second half of the
1980s. To some extent, the decline in the two shares
was an intended result of the economic reforms.
Increased competition has decreased the average
profitability of state enterprises and eroded the rev-
enue base, while with more autonomy for state
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enterprises, the share of gross profits retained by
enterprises increased. The growing proportion of
enterprises in the non-state sector (notably, rural
enterprises, foreign funded and joint-venture enter-
prises), which are generally subject to lower tax
rates, has worked in the same direction.
These trends have also had some unintended con-
sequences. Of significance for this article is the
impact of fiscal decentralisation on the centre's
redistributive role. Since the mid-1980s, interre-
gional and rural-urban inequalities have increased.
In the recently approved Ninth Five Year Plan
(1996-2000), more attention has been paid to the
reduction of regional disparities.
The basic aim of the revenue sharing system is to
stimulate the provinces' tax mobilisation efforts
through higher and often progressive provincial
retention rates. This benefits the better-off provinces,
since the revenue sharing formulae imply that the
expenditure capacity (total revenue after sharing) of
high-income provinces grows faster than that of
deficit provinces which receive direct transfers (Bahl
and Wallich 1992). Thus, a growing proportion of
revenues are retained and spent in the province where
the revenues are collected, indicating a tendency
towards the regionalisation of fiscal resources.3
'While inter-provincial inequality can be lessened
through fiscal transfers to poor provinces, the
diminished importance of central revenues has con-
strained the capacity of central government to redis-
tribute income. The proportion of local fiscal
collections remitted to the centre fell by almost one
half between 1985 and 1990 (Wong et aI. 1995). Of
Y59.6 billion fiscal transfers from the centre to
provinces in 1990, only Y8.6 billion were subsidies
under fiscal contracts made to poor provinces on the
basis of their needs. The majority of the remainder
consisted of earmarked grants (e.g. price subsidies
In 1994, the contract-based fiscal system was changed
to a rule-based system, which strengthens the centre's
position by assigning it a large proportion of key
revenues. Chung (1995) notes that some poor provinces
objected to the lack of preferential arrangements in the
standardised rules, For example, Yunnan and Guizhou
provinces may be disadvantaged by the recentralisation
of taxes on tobacco and liquor production in which
they specialise. However, it is too early at the time of
writing to evaluate the impact of the new system on the
regional distribution of fiscal resources.
to urban residents), which are distributed on the
basis of 'entitlements' rather than need (Wong et al.
1995). The increasing inequality in fiscal resources
is supported by provincial expenditure data, which
show that expenditures grew faster in wealthier than
in poorer provinces, and that per capita expendi-
tures were significantly higher in the former.
2.2 Extrabudgetary revenues
Another consequence of fiscal decentralisation has
been the growing size and importance of extrabud-
getary funds. Extrabudgetary funds are not
included in the government budget but are raised
and used by local government and ministerial agen-
cies, and state enterprises. Extrabudgetary funds
controlled by local government finance bureaux
primarily derive from surtaxes, such as the indus-
trial and commercial surtax, agricultural surtax and
urban public utility surtax. These surtaxes are off-
budget to the central budget, but can be considered
as budgetary funds for local governments.
Extrabudgetary funds are supposed to be spent on
specific items, but there is much room for manipu-
lation by local governments in their use.
Extrabudgetary funds should therefore be taken
into account when considering the regional distrib-
ution of fiscal resources and the financing of infra-
structure and social services.
The importance of extrabudgetary funds is indi-
cated by the ratio of extrabudgetary funds to bud-
getary revenues. This increased from 31 per cent in
1978 to nearly 98 per cent in 1992. The rapid
growth of extrabudgetary funds is partly a result of
the shift of economic resources from the general
governmental sector to the enterprise sector. It is
also a result of the avoidance behaviour of local
governments, since extrabudgetary revenue is gen-
erally not subject to provincial-central remittances.
It is reasonable to expect that the provincial distrib-
ution of extrabudgetary funds would be more
unequal than of budgetary funds. The increased
importance of extrabudgetary funds has further
strengthened the trend towards the regionalisation
of fiscal resources.
2.3 Self-raised funds
Some revenues controlled by governments or gov-
ernmental agencies are neither reported as bud-
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getary nor extrabudgetary funds. These off-budget
funds include bank loans, local government bonds
and additional fees levied on enterprises. Data on
self-raised funds tend to be the least transparent,
but it is clear that governments in prosperous
coastal provinces are more capable of extracting
these funds than those in poor hinterland
provinces. Thus, self-raised funds also tend to
accentuate regional inequality in fiscal resources.
3 Expenditure on Social Sectors
Constrained by falling revenues, government bud-
getary expenditures as a share of GNP experienced
a parallel decline, from about 35 per cent in 1978
to 18 per cent in 1993. The central share in total
government expenditures also declined over this
period (SSB 1995). Government budgetary expen-
ditures on culture, education, science and health
(CESH)4 grew by an average of 8.5 per cent per
annum between 1978 and 1992 (SSB 1994). Much
of this increase went to escalating labour costs so
the real increase was somewhat lower.
Of these expenditures, most occurred in wealthier
provinces and urban areas, resulting in an increased
rural-urban inequality of per capita CESH expendi-
ture (Wong et al. 1995). For example, recurrent
expenditures on health increased by 62 per cent
between 1978 and 1989. However, the share of
funds allocated to hospitals at the county level and
above increased over this period, while the share of
expenditures on township health centres and pre-
ventive activities declined (MoPH 1991).
Government expenditures on education, health and
rural relief in poor areas have remained roughly
constant (World Bank 1992).
In 1992, almost 90 per cent of expenditures on
CESH were made by local governments, accounting
for more than a quarter of total local expenditures
(Wong et al. 1995). Since townships and village
communities are responsible for the provision of
most basic social services in rural areas, the finan-
cial situation of township governments and villages
are the critical determinants of the extent and qual-
ity of social services provided.
Education and health care are the two major items in
this category
4 Township Government Finance
Both the rural economic reforms and fiscal decen-
tralisation measures have increased township gov-
ernments' fiscal functions. The majority of
townships have adopted a system of revenue sharing
with their jurisdictory county governments, which
in principle is a mimic of revenue sharing arrange-
ments between central and provincial governments.
Similar patterns in the distribution of fiscal resources
between localities and between revenue components
are found at the township level.
In 1990, township budgetary revenues equalled 12
per cent of total local budgetary revenues. Over the
period 1986-1990, township budgetary, extrabud-
getary and self-raised funds grew by 86 per cent,
181 per cent and 241 per cent respectively In 1990,
revenue collected by township governments
amounted to Y48.5 billion, of which 75 per cent
was budgetary revenue, six per cent were extrabud-
getary funds and 19 per cent were township self-
raised funds (Xiang 1992).
Each of the three components of township revenue
has its own tax sources. Budgetary revenues include
industrial and commercial taxes, such as VAT, income
tax of township and village enterprises (TVEs) and
private rural enterprises, animal slaughter tax, animal
trading tax, free market transaction tax and the agri-
cultural tax. Extrabudgetary funds derive from agri-
cultural surtaxes, industrial-commercial surtaxes,
education surtax and public utilities surtax. Township
self-raised funds come from various fees levied on
TVEs and rural households. As off-budget funds have
increased in importance, significant disparities in the
volume of revenues between townships have become
apparent (Xiang 1992).
Non-agricultural production has made significant
contributions to rural economic growth since the
early 1980s. There are a number of different forms
of rural enterprise in China. TVEs are collective
enterprises which are owned by township govern-
ments and village committees. Initial capital for
EVEs comes mainly from township governments
and village committees, but enterprise management
may be contracted to individuals. In return, these
rnterprises pay taxes and surtaxes, and may remit a
ahare of profits to the entity which owns them. In
1.994, the gross value of industrial output of TVEs
urpassed that of state industry for the first time.
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The number of private rural enterprises has also
grown rapidly In some areas, private enterprises
dominate rural non-agricultural production. They
are also subject to a number of taxes and levies,
often constituting the main source of extrabud-
getary funds of local governments.
The development of rural enterprises has been
highly concentrated in coastal provinces. In general,
the development of rural industry in poor areas has
been constrained by low levels of physical and
human capital, and disadvantaged access to domes-
tic and international markets. In poor areas, the
economy continues to be dominated by agriculture.
Taxes and fees levied on rural households often rep-
resent a higher proportion of household incomes in
poor areas than in better-off areas, but total rev-
enues remain insubstantial. The relative importance
of the different sources of township government
revenue therefore varies considerably between
townships, and poor townships are able to derive
less revenue from all three (budgetary, extrabud-
getary and off-budget) revenue sources. These poor
townships can hardly pay the salaries of township
government workers. This situation, known as chi-
fan caizheng, or 'finance for meals only', has a strong
impact on the provision of social services to rural
households.
4.1 A comparison of two
townships
To illustrate the revenue sources and expenditures
of township finance, this section presents informa-
tion from two townships: Taiping Township of
Donglan County in Guangxi Province, and Huacao
Township of Minhang District in Shanghai
Municipality Although a sample of two townships
is too small to generalise about other townships in
such a large and varied country, such a comparison
provides some insight into the problems faced in
township finance.
Taiping Township is located in a nationally desig-
nated poor county in a mountainous area of south-
west China. Taiping's per capita household net
income in 1993 was Y533, much lower than the
national average of 922. Taiping economy is
dominated by agriculture, which accounts for over
93 per cent of total employment. Four per cent of
residents found jobs in local non-agricultural sec-
Source: Taiping Township Govnriii ient E )c)ng!aei County, Guangxi Province





Industrial and Commercial Taxes 198.3
Agricultural Taxes 106.6









Family Planning Fee 12.8
Five-guarantee Welfare Fund 9.0
Water Improvement Fee 9.0
Militia Training Fee 9.0
Levy for subsidies to families of military personnel 18.0
Total available 57.8
tors, and two per cent found employment outside
the township. In 1993, the gross value of total out-
put (GVTO) in Taiping was around 15 million,
nearly two-thirds of which came from agriculture.
Huacao Township is in suburban Shanghai, one of
the most prosperous coastal cities in China. In 1993,
Huacao's per capita after-tax net income was T2 227,
more than four times that of Taiping.5 Six out of
every seven residents of Huacao were engaged in off-
farm activities, and nearly one sixth of total employ-
ment occurred outside the township. Huacao's
GVTO in 1993 was more than 520 million, and
was dominated by non-agricultural output.
Most of the disparities between the two townships
are associated with differences in the development
of TVEs. Taiping's TVEs accounted for only two per
This calculation omits the substantial profits retained
by township and sub-township enterprises and
authorities in Huacao, and thus underestimates the
actual disparity between the two townships.
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cent of GVTO and one per cent of total employ-
ment. By comparison, Huacao's TVEs generated 93
per cent of GVTO and nearly half of total employ-
ment. From its T\TEs, Huacao derived a total of over
Y66 million in taxes and remitted profits, almost
2,000 times more than in Taiping. Despite the
strong non-agricultural sector in Huacao, it is still
considered to be a rural area, since all administra-
tive townships in China are categorised as rural.
The comparison between Huacao and Taiping
therefore represents two extreme cases of rural
finance.
4.1.1 Township revenues
The two townships' government revenues and their
sources are reportèd in Tables 1 and 2. The three
components of revenues collected in Taiping
totalled Y374,000, or about T20 per capita. By com-
parison, the total revenues collected in Huacao were
35 million, well over Y2,000 per capita. Taiping
received a transfer of 75 1,000 from the county,
more than double the revenues collected in the
township. This transfer increased its available bud-
getary revenue to over Yl million. On the other
hand, Huacao remitted over 60 per cent of its Y18
million budgetary revenue to the county Despite
these transfers, considerable disparities between the
two townships remain. After-transfer available rev-
enues in Taiping were Y1.1 million, or 63 per
capita, and in Huacao were T25. 1 million, or 1479
per capita.
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An examination of the structure of the three rev-
enue components finds that Taiping's off-budget
(extrabudgetary and self-raised) revenues were
insignificant compared with budgetary revenues.
The former accounted for just 18 per cent of total
revenue collected and only six per cent of total
after-transfer revenues. In Huacao, off-budget rev-
enues accounted for almost half of total revenue
collected and 72 per cent of total after-transfer rev-
enues. The larger share of olf-budget revenues in
Table 2 Fiscal revenues of Huacao Township, Shanghai Municipality, 1993
Notes. The Education Surtax was delivered to the township education committee after V54000 was submit-
ted to the district government.
b V100,000 of the Embankment Maintenance Surtax was submitted to the district government.
This transfer was for spending on education.
Agriculture and sideline production subsidy funds are levied based on the gross value of output of
enterprises; the social spending fund is based on their profits. Individual business owners pay Y200 per
household for subsidies to agriculture and '6O per household for subsidies to sideline production.







Corporate Income Tax 3,944.1
Agricultural Tax 485.3
City Construction Tax 172.9
Foreign Funded Enterprise Tax 501.9
Submitted to county government - 11,180.7




Rural Education Surtaxa 432.6
Embankment Maintenance Surtax 213.3
Revenues from real estate development 15,000.0
Submitted to district government -154.0




Agricultural Activities Fundd 556.6
Sideline Production Fundd 143.1
Social Spending Funde 293.5
Total available 993.2
the total revenues available is due to the fact that
they are not subject to remittance to the upper level
of government.
In rural China, taxes and fees are levied on either
enterprises or households. In general, industrial
and commercial taxes (ICI) are borne by enter-
prises, whereas most agricultural taxes (e.g. the
agricultural tax, agricultural and forestry specialty
tax, and farmland user tax) are borne by agricul-
tural households. Therefore, it is worthwhile to
compare the proportion of taxes and fees directly
imposed on rural households in the two townships.
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Just like other poor townships in rural China,
Taiping is characterised by the underdevelopment of
rural enterprises. Due to the absence of IVEs as
sources of revenue, the township government has to
rely heavily on direct collections from rural house-
holds. Over one third of Taiping's budgetary rev-
enues came from agricultural taxes, which were
levied on rural households (Table 1). This is also
true for off-budgetary revenues. Although just under
two-thirds of budgetary revenues came from the cat-
egory of ICI, part of this was borne by households,
since this category includes such taxes as free mar-
ket transaction tax, animal trading tax, and slaugh-
Table 3 Fiscal expenditures of Taiping Township, Guangxi Province, 1993







Total budgetary expenditures 1,1 53.1 82.8
Aid to agricultural production 40.0
Agriculture and forestry 60.7 75.5





High schools 174.3 79.9
Primary schools 592.4 97.0
Health
of which: 72.3 65.4
Township health centre 72.3 65.4
Village health stations 0.0 0.0
Family planning 12.8 92.0
Radio, movie and TV 5.4 89.9
Administration cost 148.9 61.9
Township fiscal office 52.1 28.4
General administration 96.8 80.0
Other 43.9 88.5
Total extrabudgetary expenditures 11.3




Total self-raised fund expenditures 57.8
ter tax. In Huacao, on the other hand, taxes levied
on enterprises accounted for over 96 per cent of
liudgetary revenue collected (Table 2). Most extra-
budgetary revenues and self-raised funds were also
derived from enterprises. Thus, in spite of the much
smaller volume of per capita township government
revenues in Taiping, rural households have a heavier
tax burden relative to their net income, since in
Huacao virtually all taxes are paid by TVEs.
The way taxes are collected from households has an
adverse effect on the distribution of income. Most
taxes and fees, such as fees for education, cultural
activities, family planning, militia training etc., are
imposed on a per capita or per household basis at a
flat rate regardless of income (Li et al. 1990). Some
are levied on household land area, but since land
and household size do not vary greatly within a
ownship in China, they approximate per capita
lees. This implies a regressive tax rate, in which
poor households pay proportionately more than
better-off ones. To protect rural households from
over-extraction by local governments and village
authorities, the central government has stipulated
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that levies should not exceed five per cent of house-
hold net income. Some reports suggest that this
limit has sometimes not been observed.
4.1.2 Township expenditures
Township expenditures in Taiping and Huacao are
reported in Tables 3 and 4. Reflecting the disparity
in the revenues available to the two townships, total
budgetary and off-budgetary expenditures were
Yl .2 million in Taiping and Y 18.7 million in
Huacao, which translates into per capita expendi-
tures of Y66 and Y1,040 respectively
Two observations can be made about the structure of
Taiping's spending. First, Taiping's expenditures were
almost exhausted by recurrent costs. Nearly 90 per
cent of total expenditures were spent on recurrent
costs of the culture, education and health (CEH) sec-
tors and the township administration. By comparison,
although recurrent expenditures on these sectors in
6 It is not clear whether the 6.4 million difference
between total available revenues and expenditures is
due to an actual surplus or to unreported expenditures.
Table 4 Fiscal expenditures of Huacao Township, Shanghai Municipality, 1993













Extrabudgetary expenditures 17,744.0 6,881 .9 10,862.1 51.4
Budgetary expenditures 8,147.7 4,408.3 3,739.4 61.0
Administration 950,0 950.0 25.7
Agriculture 321.0 321.0
Education 2,690.0 2,690.0 82.3
Health care 1,244.5 150.0 1,094.5
Welfare 162.3 162.3 15.8
Other 2,777.9 456.0 2,323.9 45.0
Extrabudgetary expenditures 9,596.3 2,473.6 7,122.7 34.4
Administration 1,400.3 1,400.3 42.8
Agriculture 5,220.0 450.0 4,770.0 55.6
Education 498.3 498.3
Others 2,477.7 125.0 2,352.7
Self-raised funds 909.8
Huacao were four times the level of Taiping's, they
only accounted for 20 per cent of total expenditures.
Second, Taiping's recurrent costs were dominated
by the labour costs (wages, subsidies and pensions)
of employees of township government and public
institutions, such as schools and the township
health centre. This item accounted for nearly 83 per
cent of total budgetary expenditures, and over 90
per cent of GEH expenditures (Table 3). By com-
parison, Huacao allocated more than 60 per cent of
its total expenditures to capital investments, indi-
cating the active involvement of the township in
developing economic activities. While recurrent
costs accounted for less than 40 per cent of total
expenditures, labour costs accounted for just over
half of recurrent costs (Table 4).
Since the number of government employees has
proved difficult to reduce, and their salaries are
based on a national salary scheme, the labour costs
of township governments are downwardly rigid.
Thus, only revenues after payment of labour costs
are really at the disposal of township governments.
The gap in after-payroll revenue between the two
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townships is much wider than that for total rev-
enues. The ratio of Huacao's after-payroll revenues
to Taiping's is 45:1, compared with the ratio of total
available revenues (24:1) and total expenditures
(16:1).
4.1.3 Village funds
Villages are not a level of government, but are a
community or collective entity, and their revenues
are not included in local government budgetary
data. However, villages also have self-raised funds.
The actual disparities between the two townships
are even more striking if we take into account the
different financial capacities of their villages.
In Taiping, villages have little resources to finance
any services for their residents. Even the 40
monthly subsidies for village leaders are paid by the
township government. In contrast, villages and sub-
village units in Huacao have their own financial
resources, funded by revenues from their enter-
prises. This enables them to operate their own
health care, pension and primary education pro-
grammes. Villages and sub-village units in Huacao
provided 58 per cent of the total off-budgetary
Table 5 Social welfare expenditures, Huacao Township, Shanghai
Municipality, 1993










Total 3,324.5 1,397.9 1,405.8 520.8
Five-guarantee programme 14.8 10.0 3.9 0.9
Income maintenance 21.8 8.2 11.7 1.9
Subsidies to families of
military personnel
140.7 105.0 15.6 20.1
Kindergartens 300.9 289.4 11 .5
Culture and Education 598.3 490.0 91.4 16.9
Pensions 1,473.7 617.5 536.6 319.6
Nursing homes 70.0 70.0
Cooperative health care
schemes
621.4 91.1 401.9 128.4
Family planning programme 82.9 6.1 55.3 21.5
funding for local social services (Table 5). They
accounted for 62 per cent of the off-budgetary
funding for income maintenance programmes, 58
per cent of the off-budgetary funding for pension
programmes, and 85 per cent of the off-budgetary
funding for cooperative health care schemes.
4.1.4 Provision of social services
huacao spent over V4.4 million on the education
and health sectors, or 261 per capita. This is
almost six times Taiping's figure of Y47 per capita.
Abundant funding has allowed Huacao to extend its
social services. The township runs its own pension
programmes which provided 2,696 elderly with an
average of Y445 per person in 1993. Cooperative
health care schemes were established in all villages,
reimbursing their residents for 50-80 per cent of
health care expenses.
In contrast, 'finance for meals only' means that after
public employees' wages are paid (to better-off non-
agricultural households), little is left for spending on
basic social services for poorer agricultural house-
holds. For example, in Donglan county as a whole,
most villages have no health stations at all, and none
of its villages have cooperative health care schemes or
other health insurance programmes. Similar prob-
[ems are faced in education and other basic social ser-
vices. In 1993, 89 households in Donglan were
entitled to welfare support through the five-guaran-
tee programme.7 The government provided each
with only 12 cash per month and 14 kg of food-
grains per year. This support is far too little to bring
them above the poverty line, or to ensure they have
access to health services when they are sick. Only
half of rural residents who had foodgrain shortages
received aid from relief programmes (Donglan 1994).
insufficient funding of health services has led to an
emphasis on income-generating activities. Fees are
now charged for many services, leading to a shift of
resources from primary health care to more expen-
sive, curative practice (Tang et al. 1994) and a sub-
optimal level of preventive service provision (see
Shu et al. 1997). Other basic services, such as tele-
phones and postal services, have also been under-
funded or cut altogether.
'This provides food, clothing, fuel, housing and funeral
expenses for the elderly and disabled who are unable to
work and who lack family support.
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5 Options for Increased Funding
to Poor Townships
The trend towards the regionalisation of fiscal rev-
enues is partly induced by fiscal decentralisation. At
the macro-level, the centre's redistributive role
should be strengthened on the basis of a more
transparent, rule-based fiscal system. More demand
elements, such as population and income level,
should be incorporated into the formulae for deter-
mining central-provincial transfers, and transfers
between lower level governments. Off-budgetary
revenues should be redefined and closely moni-
tored. In poor areas, the government finance
required to maintain the minimum acceptable level
of basic social services, especially primary educa-
tion and primary health care, should be rigidly
defined and given the highest priority The provi-
sion of basic social services should be an important
indicator in the evaluation of local government per-
formance. In addition, strong urban-biased devel-
opment policies, such as suppressing the
procurement prices of grains to subsidise urban res-
idents, should be gradually eliminated.
Fiscal decentralisation has placed pressures on poor
townships by strengthening the link between town-
ship expenditures and revenues. Although this
strategy may stimulate more active involvement of
township governments in local economic develop-
ment, it leaves the quality and extent of basic social
services in rural communities conditional upon
local revenues. At the township and village levels, it
is important to ensure that fiscal resources are effi-
ciently utilised and that social services reach the
poor villages and households. Most fiscal revenues
available to poor townships are spent on the labour
costs of government and public institutions. These
tend to be concentrated in the county and township
seats, favouring non-agricultural households and
exacerbating the shortage of social services pro-
vided to rural households. Yet taxes and fees place
a heavier burden on rural households in poor areas.
It is important to ensure the full participation of vil-
lagers or village committees in decision making
regarding the use of these levies. This would help
ensure that the funds are spent more equitably on
the welfare of the whole community.
Insufficient funding is a major cause of the under-pro-
vision of social services to rural households in poor
townships. Even if all collected funds are appropriately
used for the community, poor villages will still not be
able to finance basic social services without external
financial assistance. To increase fiscal transfers from
the centre involves complicated issues, and not just
economic ones. Therefore, two additional sources of
funding for social services are suggested here.
Poverty alleviation funds. One potential source of
financing social services in poor rural areas are the
national and provincial poverty alleviation funds.
Since 1986, China has shifted the focus of poverty
alleviation programmes from relief to poverty
reduction through economic development. In
recent years, the central government has allocated
more than '4 billion in grants and subsidised cred-
its annually to assist the nationally designated poor
provinces. In addition, most provinces have their
own programmes to support provincially desig-
nated poor counties. Total provincial support to
these counties is roughly equal to central govern-
ment support to nationally designated poor coun-
ties. These programmes have played a significant
role in promoting income growth of the poor
through improvement of infrastructure and devel-
opment projects in poor areas (World Bank 1992).
The new strategy of focusing on economic develop-
ment in poor areas is of great significance. However,
there has been a tendency to overemphasise pro-
jects that generate short-run revenues. The provi-
sion of basic social services which cannot generate
quick profits has been neglected. Since investment
in human capital, such as primary education and
health care, is an important determinant of eco-
8 The policy has been modified since the mid-1980s.
Most provincial regulations now allow rural couples to
have a second child if the first one is a girl after a
specified minimum years of spacing.
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